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Abstract 
We study the impact of high and low frequency incentives in a joint-liability 
framework on six academic outcomes of undergraduate students using a randomized 
field experiment.  As recently documented in health literature, incentives to exercise 
are effective in developing healthy habits. Therefore, we design groups of three 
students and provide a premium to the homework’s grade if all the members of the 
group (three) meet some requirements. We investigate how the frequency of these take 
home tests affect the students study habits and thus, the academic outcomes. We find 
that there are no differences in the student’s educational outcomes between the high 
and low frequency groups. 
We also explore if male and female students respond differently to a joint-liability 
incentives scheme. We find that this treatment improves the accumulated grade 
average of male students, but not for females.  This finding is in line with previous 
research on joint-liability and gender behavior, but now we present it in a novel 
context.  
Finally, the paper outlines the main evaluation challenges associated with a field 
experiment in the classroom and provide some lessons to improve evaluation designs 
and to foster future randomized controlled trials in this area. 
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I. Introduction 
Recent evidence from the health literature indicates that financial incentives are 
effective in developing healthy habits and improving health indicators. Charness and 
Gneezy (2010) find that it may be possible to encourage exercise by providing a 
monetary compensation for attending a gym a determined number of times during one 
month. Their findings support the ‘habit formation’ hypothesis, that suggests that 
one’s utility from consumption depends on one’s past consumption. If one’s current 
consumption of the good increases, one’s future consumption of the good increases as 
well because the present consumption of the good raises the marginal utility of future 
consumption (Becker and Murphy, 1988). They opposed this hypothesis to the 
‘crowding-out effect’. Assuming that participants are initially intrinsically motivated to 
exercise, the extrinsic intervention could be counterproductive and destroy their initial 
motives to exercise.  If they firstly exercised because they felt it was good for their 
health, once the incentives are introduced, they might feel they do it just for the money. 
Hence, the intrinsic motives are destroyed. They conclude that habits increase the 
marginal utility from doing exercise and therefore participants of the experiment 
engage in more physical activity in the future.  
The same relevant question of whether incentives are effective in developing 
good habits arises in the education field. When we focus on previous literature in 
education, we find that monetary rewards do not usually motivate students (Angrist, 
Oreopoulos, and Williams, 2010; Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulous 2009; Fryer 2010) and 
grades do not explicitly encourage them (Grant and Green, 2012). Perhaps the existing 
incentives are not significant or effective enough to improve the academic performance 
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of students. It might also be possible that students are aware of the benefits of 
studying, but are not capable of improving their performance without external 
support.  
However, there is recent evidence that supports joint-liability schemes as a way 
to provide incentives to students. As the teacher wants to exert effort from his students, 
he designs a contract in which students have incentives to monitor each other. Cabrera 
and Cid (2013) find that a joint-liability scheme- in comparison to individual incentives 
and control groups - impacts positively on grades of take-home tests and midterm 
exams, but not on the finals. In other words, joint-liability incentives may not succeed 
in developing strong study habits as the effects fade out in the long run. 
Considering the benefits of exercising more on health and the positive effects on 
educational performance of a joint-liability framework, we design an experiment to 
explore if the frequency in which the take-home tests are assigned may cause 
differences in students’ performance under a joint-liability scheme. 
Thus, in each classroom, the instructor designed groups of three students and 
provided a premium to the take-home tests’ grade if all the members of the group met 
some requirements. To test how the frequency of these take-home tests could affect the 
academic performance of the students, two modalities were implemented: eight take-
home tests (low frequency) and sixteen take-home tests (high frequency). To prevent 
students from self-virtuous group selection, participants were randomly assigned to 
each group.  
Following Becker and Murphy (1988) and taking into account the findings in 
the fitness intervention of Charness and Gneezy (2009), we expect that students with 
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high frequency take-home tests will improve their academic performance in 
comparison to those with low frequency take-home tests, as a result of being more 
frequently exposed to exercises. Not only we analyze the students’ performance in the 
intervention courses, but also we study the spillover effects on the overall academic 
outcomes. 
We find that there are no differences in the educational outcomes of the 
students between the high and low frequency groups. However, the sign of the 
coefficients are plausible, in line with Becker and Murphy (1988). Possible reasons for 
these results are the small sample size (that was exacerbated by the attrition 
experienced in the evaluation), the difference in the frequency between groups may not 
be enough to generate differences in effort, and the spillover effects between groups 
due to the student’s exchange of take-home solutions. These are lessons to improve 
future field experiments in a similar context. 
In the second part of the paper, we explore the impact of a joint-liability 
framework on the gender gap in the accumulated grade average in the student’s 
career. For this section we pool data from two experiments to increase power. Our 
results show that the incentives designed as a joint-liability scheme improves students 
performance. But this overall positive effect masks gender disparities, since it is 
concentrated in male students who improve their academic outcomes significantly. 
However, there is no evidence of an effect of the joint-liability incentives on female 
students. This result is in line with Duflo et al. (2013) and Crépon et al. (2011) that find 
no significant joint-liability effects on women empowerment.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II describes the program and 
explains the experiment’s design, section III presents the econometric model and 
results, and section IV the discussion and V conclusion. 
II. Program and Experiment Design 
The experimental courses at Universidad de Montevideo (a private university in 
Uruguay) were taken primarily by freshmen students majoring in Economics, 
Management and Accountancy. These courses were Macroeconomics I and Descriptive 
Economics, both core courses at the University. These were structured in the same way 
in the 2012 academic year: a midterm exam (35% of the final grade), take-home tests 
(15%) and a final exam (50%). Each course has sixty classes of fifty minutes, each 
distributed throughout fifteen weeks and students are allowed to have up to 15 
absences. Both Macroeconomics I and Descriptive Economics share similar 
characteristics in the grading system with other courses at the University.  
In Table 1 we define the variables used in the paper and present a set of 
descriptive statistics. We have a sample of 48 students over 18 years old with a mean 
average grade of 7.5; two thirds are from the interior of the country, nearly 42% are 
female students and approximately 30% of the students come from two private high 
schools in Montevideo. Nearly 10% of the students in the classroom have a job, 19% are 
social volunteers and, on average, the students in the intervention practice sports 5 
hours a week. Also, students are equally distributed between the Macroeconomics and 
Descriptive Economics courses. With respect to the student’s social behaviors, students 
of the sample devoted 33% of their time of study to do so in groups. When students 
were asked about the share of classmates that were friends, we find that, on average, 
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13% of the classmates are friends. Analogous, the average percentage of unknown 
students is 60%.  
[Insert Table 1] 
The aim of the intervention is to test if high frequency take-home tests improve 
or not academic performance under a joint-liability scheme. We designed a 
randomized trial in order to evaluate the intervention, with the approval of the ethical 
review board of the university. 
Students were randomly assigned to two groups. Using this evaluation design 
we avoided self-virtuous group selection that could have grouped lazy students in the 
low frequency or control group. In the high frequency take-home tests group 
(Treatment Group), the student was randomly assigned to a group of three and 
received a 20% increase in the grade if each student in the group fulfilled the following 
conditions: obtained a grade of at least 6 in the take-home test and had no absences 
during the week in which the take-home test had to be handed in. They were assigned 
16 take-home tests during 15 weeks of classes. 
In the low frequency take-home tests group (Control Group), the student was 
randomly assigned to a group of three and had the same conditions to get the bonus of 
20% increase in the grade. The only difference was that these students had 8 take-home 
tests during 15 weeks of classes. 
For both treatment and control group, take-home tests did not require team 
work. Each student was required to hand in the solutions in a personal sheet at the 
beginning of the class (they were allowed to prepare the take-homes with another 
classmate). It is important to notice that the content of the 16 take-home tests is exactly 
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the same to the content of the 8 take-home tests; the difference between groups is in the 
distribution of tasks in the 15 weeks of classes. So, the treatment is a variation only in 
the frequency of the exercise, not in the total amount of exercise performed in the course. 
There were 48 students in this field experiment: 24 in Macroeconomics and 24 
in Descriptive Economics. In August 2012, all 48 applicants were asked to complete a 
survey. Thus, we collected baseline data on a wide array of students characteristics 
such as age, gender, working hours, hours devoted to sports and volunteering, high 
school of origin, region of the country they came from, travel time to university, 
academic expectations and number of friends in the course. Then, 24 students were 
randomly assigned to the high frequency take-home tests group and 24 students to the 
low frequency take-home tests group. 
Timeline of the Program and Data Collection 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the three groups had similar characteristics. They were 
balanced in eighteen observable variables.  
[Insert Table 2] 
It is necessary to mention that some observations suffered attrition. It is not rare 
that students drop out from some courses during the semester due to different reasons 
(e.g. freshmen students usually change to other degrees and some students drop out 
1
st 
week of 
classes in 
August 2012 
Baseline Survey 
2
nd
week of 
classes in 
August 2012 
Randomization 
and start of the 
program 
15
th
week of 
classes in 
November 2012 
Follow-up surveys 
and end of the 
courses 
Final Exams 
Three 
possibilities: 
December 2012, 
February 2013 
and March 2013. 
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before taking the midterm exam). In November 2012, 6 students dropped out of the 
program (2 students in Treatment group and 4 students in the Control group). We have 
some outcomes and follow-up administrative data for those who suffered attrition, but 
we could not collect the information on all the outcomes of interest for the whole 
sample (e.g. grade in midterm exam). Therefore, taking into account this information, 
we compared pre-treatment characteristics of the individuals that suffered attrition and 
the students that remained in the treatment/control groups: all the variables remained 
balanced1. 
III. Econometric Model and Results 
High Frequency vs. Low Frequency Take- Home Tests  
The aim of this study is to estimate the causal effect of high frequency take-home tests 
on student’s achievements. Formally, we estimate the following equation: 
 =  +  + 	 + 

 +  
where   is one of the outcomes of interest for student i (grade in midterm exam, grade 
in final exam, average grade in take-home tests2, average grade in midterm exams and 
homework of other simultaneous courses, average grade in final exams of other 
simultaneous courses, accumulated grade average in the student’s career)3, is the 
parameter of interest: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if student i is 
assigned to High Frequency Treatment (16 take-home tests) and zero otherwise, 
	 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if student i belongs to the 
                                                          
1Results are available from the authors upon request. 
2 These three grades are standardized. Standardized grades are calculated by subtracting the 
course mean (Descriptive Economics or Microeconomics I) and dividing by the course standard 
deviation. We do not include the 20% prize in the average grade in take-home tests. 
3In Panel B of Table 1 we present a description of the outcome variables at the follow-up. 
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Macroeconomics course and zero otherwise, 
  is a matrix of student characteristics, 
and  is the error term. Given the random assignment to the treatment and inexistence 
of non-compliers, we estimate the equation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
The question is whether high frequency take-home tests in a joint liability 
framework raise the student’s academic performance. In table 3 we investigate the 
effect of the treatment on the educational outcomes (grade in midterm exam, grade in final 
exam and average grade in take-home tests) in comparison to the control group. There are 
no significant differences between the two groups. However, there is an effect of the 
treatment on midterm exams only if the differences are taken at the fifteen percent level.  
[Insert Table 3] 
In addition to this, it could be argue d that the high frequency of the take-home 
tests on the experimental courses may have worsen the educational outcomes on other 
courses at the university (treated students diverted effort from other subjects in order 
to earn the 20% bonus). Thus, we study the following outcomes: average grade in 
midterm exams and homework of other simultaneous courses, average grade in final exams of 
other simultaneous courses, total average grade in the student’s career. We find that there are 
no differences between the control group and the treatment group.  
Though we do not find significant effects, the coefficient of the treatment 
dummy (16 take-home tests) has the expected sign in the regressions. Thus, the 
treatment (high frequency take-home tests) seems to be positively associated with an 
improved average grade in take-home tests and with higher standardized grades in 
midterm exams and standardized grades in the final exams. Taking into account the 
spillover effects on the overall academic performance, though the effects are not 
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significant, the signs of the coefficients of the treatment dummy are consistent with the 
initial hypothesis that a higher frequency in take-home tests impacts positively on 
academic achievement not only on the treatment courses but also on the simultaneous 
courses. 
One possible explanation for the lack of significance is that there were only 48 
students in the experiment. The results were also weakened due to the attrition in the 
intervention: six students in our sample is a relevant share. Another reason is that, 
although students in the low frequency group had to hand in their tasks every two 
weeks, they could advance their tasks studying with those of the treatment group 
(positive spillover effects) and therefore no differences in habit formation arise. In this 
sense, the spillover effects are present. Also, it could happen that the difference in the 
frequency of take-home tests is too small to see differences in effort among students; or 
that the duration of the intervention (15 weeks) is too short to see changes in habit 
formation. Finally, we do not rule out the possibility that what is only working is the 
joint-liability incentive and the frequency is not a relevant factor. We properly discuss 
each of these arguments in the last section of this paper. 
 
Gender & Academic Outcomes 
Gender differences have been widely documented. Boys  have more attention and 
behavioral difficulties, lower levels of inhibitory control and perceptual sensitivity and 
are more likely to be diagnosed attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Bertrand and 
Pan, 2013; Ruigrok, et al., 2014). Whether this gender gap in non-cognitive skills is 
determined by biological differences or social influences is unclear. Biological 
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differences are associated to differences between male and female brain structure in 
areas related to mood, emotions and emotion regulation. Social influences may be 
related to home and school environment (Bertrand and Pan, 2013). We are particularly 
interested in gender because it is highly correlated to non-cognitive skills, which in 
turn might be a determinant of educational achievements.  
We focus on the effect that a joint-liability framework may have on the 
accumulated grade average considering the interaction term with gender. Cabrera and 
Cid (2013) find that joint-liability incentives are effective in improving academic 
performance. However, whether these incentives are beneficial to female and male 
students is uncertain. Previous literature in microfinance finds no significant joint-
liability effects on women empowerment (Duflo et al., 2013; Crépon et al., 2011). 
Therefore, we expect no significant changes in the accumulated grade average on 
female students. 
For this section we make use of an experiment conducted the year before the 
current experiment. We will take advantage that we designed the two experiments 
with the same joint-liability framework, they were implemented in the same courses 
and with similar populations, they share the same baseline survey, and we have a 
homogeneous outcome in both years: average grades. The main difference between the 
two experiments is that in Cabrera and Cid (2013) the focus was to evaluate the effects 
of joint-liability incentives on educational outcomes in comparison to individual 
incentives and a control group, and in new experiment presented in the first part of the 
paper the interest was in the effect of high vs low frequency tasks. It is important to 
notice that we designed both experiments in such a way that they share the same joint 
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liability framework, so we can pool the data from both years and have a joint-liability 
treatment randomly assigned to students. In table 4 we present the balance in 15 pre-
treatment variables for this experiment (that pools data from two years). Students 
treated with joint-liability incentives are in fact identical to students from the control 
group. There is only one variable with a slightly significant difference (p-val 0.095), but 
1 variable in 15 that is significant at the 10% level is less than what one would expect 
by random chance. The only difference between the pool of subjects is that some of 
them were treated in the first year and the rest in the second year.  
After establishing the validity of the research design with random assignment 
of the treatment, we will present baseline descriptive statistics by gender. In table 5 we 
describe female and male students at baseline. Male and female students are not 
different in age or region of the country, they have similar educational aspirations, 
devote a similar share of their time to study in group, to travel to university and to 
volunteer in social activities and the percentage of them that have a job is alike. Also, 
the satisfaction with classmates is akin. However, male students tend to spend more 
time practicing sports, have more friends in the classroom and less classmates 
considered unknown. Female students have a higher average grade – almost one point 
of difference: 8.4 vs. 7.5- and a higher percentage of them are majoring in economics. 
We also find that a higher percentage of male students are taking the macroeconomics 
course. In the second year of the experiment there were more women participating. 
The outcome of interest is the accumulated grade average in the student’s 
career. This variable provides an overall picture of the students’ performance and we 
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exploit the fact that was measured before and after the joint-liability treatment (and it 
is homogenously measured in both years). 
Taking this into account, we first report the effect of being in a joint-liability 
framework on the difference experienced in the accumulated grade average. After that, 
we estimate the effect of being in a joint-liability framework considering an interaction 
term with gender. 
In table 6 we present the results of the first regression, expressed in the 
following equation:  
_ =  +  + 	  
where	_ is the difference in the student’s accumulated grade average for 
student i,  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if student i is assigned to a 
joint-liability scheme and zero otherwise4. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Results indicate that students in a joint-liability framework experience a higher 
increase in the accumulated grade average than students in the control group. Because 
of randomization, we assume that if any difference exists between the treatment and 
control groups in the accumulated grade average at the end of the experiment, it is due 
to the effects of joint-liability incentives. Figure 1 shows the differences-in-differences 
framework and what would have happened to individuals in the treatment group if 
they had not received the intervention. They should have 7.2 as their accumulated 
grade average. However, students in the treatment group averaged 7.8. The difference 
                                                          
4 Students treated with joint-liability are thus the treatment group of the experiment of the 
previous year (joint-liability incentives with 8 take-home tests) and the treatment and control 
groups in the high frequency experiment (joint-liability incentives with 16 or 8 take-home tests). 
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between the counterfactual and the actual outcome is 0.62 and significant at the one 
percent level (column 1 of table 6).  
When we control for macroeconomic course dummy, year dummy, region 
dummy and age (in months), we find that the effect is still present and was slightly 
affected5. Finally, controlling for gender, the effect remains essentially the same and is 
significant at the ten percent level.  
We also estimate if men and women react in different ways to the joint liability 
incentives. We are interested in considering the effect of being a female student in a 
joint-liability framework on the difference in the accumulated grade average. 
Therefore, we estimate the following equation and present the results in Table 7: 
 =  +  +  +  ∗  + 
 +  
where  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when student i is a 
female student and zero otherwise, and  ∗   is an interaction term that captures 
the effect of a joint-liability framework when the student is female. In other words, the 
effect that a joint-liability framework may have on the difference in the accumulated 
grade average is not only limited to b, but also depends on the values of d and	. 
The term 
  is a matrix of controls: year dummy, course dummy, region dummy and 
age (in months). 
[Insert Table 7] 
We observe that a joint-liability framework directly increases the difference in 
the accumulated grade’s average by 0.54 for both female and male students. This effect 
is significant at the one percent level. However, there is a negative effect of the joint-
                                                          
5 The only unbalanced control is the year dummy variable. 
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liability framework that arises from the interaction term with gender. When the 
student is female, there is a decrease in the outcome by 0.68 and this effect is significant 
at the ten percent level. Therefore, we test whether the sum of these coefficients -
	(0.54) and	(-0.68), coefficients of the variables  and ( ∗ )-is different from 
zero. Taken together both effects, that is, the direct effect of a joint-liability scheme and 
its interaction effect with gender, we find that a joint-liability framework keeps the 
academic performance of female students unchanged. However, the performance of 
male students is increased significantly by 0.54. 
Taking these results into account, we find that a joint-liability framework has a 
positive effect in the difference experienced in the accumulated grade average in the 
case of male students. However, this framework prevents female students from 
performing better and therefore their accumulated grade average remains constant.  
IV. Discussion 
Although we could not find significant differences between the treatment and control 
groups in the frequencies experiment, we find that the signs are the expected ones. This 
is in line with our hypothesis that high frequency take-home tests improve academic 
performance through the development of study habits.   
In order to contribute to future research, we should point out lessons in order to 
avoid a broken design. The lack of significance could be due to the small sample size, 
which was aggravated with the attrition of the intervention. In a future intervention we 
should increase the sample size. Power limitations prevent us from doing any further 
analyses of mechanisms or heterogeneous treatment effects and, as a result, many 
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interesting questions about who benefits from a higher frequency in incentives or from 
group versus individual incentives are left unanswered.  
Another reason for the lack of significance may be that although students in the 
low frequency group had to hand in their tasks every two weeks, they could advance 
their tasks studying with those of the treatment group and therefore no differences 
arise (positive spillover effect). In a future intervention, we should design different 
take-home tests for treatment and control groups in order to avoid spillover effects 
arising from treated and control students studying together. 
In next interventions it could be useful to design the high frequency treatment 
with more variability in order to avoid the possible critic that in case of finding positive 
effects of 16 take-home tests against 8 take-home tests, it is impossible to disentangle if 
the crucial issue is the increase in the frequency in any amount or simply the 
duplication of the frequency. 
Also, we should explore the effects of a longer intervention. Extending the high 
frequency experiment, during a whole academic year (30 weeks), might help us to 
assess the necessity of time to develop strong study habits. 
Apart from questioning whether different frequencies may alter the experiment, 
studying how the class and group size as well as prize size may change the results in 
the joint-liability scheme remains for future research. In a larger class or in a larger 
group, the costs of monitoring each other may be too high that students simply prefer 
to lose the prize, no matter the frequency of their take-home tests.  
With reference to the external validity of our experiment, the conclusions are 
limited to similar students in a similar background, that is, freshman students taking 
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introductory courses at university. However, there are potential applications as long as 
a certain population is aware of the benefits of a determined activity but is not capable 
of changing its behavior without external support.  We provide researchers with 
reliable evidence to apply in a wide array of issues such as performance pay for 
teachers, home-owners to use less-energy, incentives to employees in a firm. In a future 
intervention, we plan to include in the experiment students that are advanced in their 
undergraduate courses. 
V. Conclusions  
In this paper we analyze the impact of high and low frequency take-home tests in a 
joint-liability framework on six academic outcomes of undergraduate students using a 
randomized field experiment. There are no significant differences between the 
treatment and control groups in the high frequency experiment, but we find that the 
signs are the expected ones in line with our main hypothesis and with previous 
literature in the area of health: exercising more frequently improves academic 
outcomes and the mechanism behind this finding might be the study habits developed 
by exercising.  
Our second contribution is to show that incentives designed as a joint-liability 
scheme have an different impact by gender. Male students improve their academic 
outcome significantly when placed in a joint-liability framework. But this incentives 
design does not help female students to improve their academic performance. This is 
consistent with previous results applying a joint-liability scheme in microfinance for 
women, but this is a novel result in the area of education. 
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A randomized controlled trial is an impact evaluation method that relies on 
straightforward comparisons of outcomes between treatment and control groups to 
measure the effects of a program. Thus, a randomized design may provide greater 
confidence to policymakers because of its simplicity and transparency. Nevertheless, 
many details in the implementation of an RCT may compromise the evaluation design. 
Consequently, one of the aims of this paper is precisely to contribute to future research 
on the evaluation of incentives, to provide researchers with evidence to apply in a wide 
array of issues (performance pay for teachers, home-owners to use less-energy, 
incentives to employees in a firm), to present lessons to avoid a broken design and to 
assess heterogeneous effects such as gender ones.  
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Table 1 - Definition of baseline characteristics and outcome variables 
 
Description of the variables Mean S.D. Min Max Observations 
A) Baseline Characteristics 
           
Age (in months) Student’s age (in months) 240.743 24.369 218.893 320.712 48 
Work 
Dummy variable (1= Student 
works, 0= Student does not work) 
0.104 0.309 0 1 48 
Volunteering 
Dummy variable (1= Volunteer at 
social activities, 0= otherwise) 
0.188 0.394 0 1 48 
High school 1 
Dummy variable (1= Student 
attended High School 1, 0= 
Student did not attend High 
School 1) 
0.167 0.377 0 1 48 
High School 2 
Dummy variable (1= Student 
attended High School 2, 0= 
Student did not attend High 
School 2) 
0.146 0.357 0 1 48 
Interior 
Dummy variable (1= Student is 
from the Interior of the country, 0 
=Student is from the capital) 
0.333 0.476 0 1 48 
Hours of sport per week 
Hours spent doing sports per 
week 
5.360 3.945 0 15 48 
Satisfaction with 
classmates 
Student’s satisfaction with 
classmates. Scale: 1-very 
unsatisfied, 5-very satisfied. 
4.146 0.899 1 5 48 
Average grade 
Total average grade accumulated 
in the student’s career. (Min=0, 
Max=12) 
7.556 2.103 0 11.2 48 
Female 
Dummy variable (1=Female, 
0=Male) 
0.417 0.498 0 1 48 
Bachelor in economics 
Dummy variable (1= Student is 
studying for a bachelor in 
economics, 0=Student is studying 
for a bachelor in management or 
accountancy) 
0.583 0.498 0 1 48 
Travel time to university 
(minutes) 
Minutes spent travelling to 
university 
24.313 18.506 10 120 48 
Course 
Dummy variable (1= course in 
Macroeconomics, 0= course in 
Descriptive Economics) 
0.500 0.505 0 1 48 
Study in group (in % of 
the time) 
Percentage of time that students 
study in group 
0.335 0.199 0.020 0.82 48 
Friends (%) 
Percentage of friends in the 
course 
0.125 0.126 0 0.455 48 
Still unknown (%) 
Percentage of students that are 
unknown 
0.605 0.291 0 1 48 
Educational Aspirations 
Scale: 1- Bachelor unfinished, 2-
Hold a Bachelor’s degree, 3-Hold 
two bachelor’s degrees, 4-Hold a 
master’s degree, 5- Hold a Ph.D. 
degree 
3.604 1.106 2 5 48 
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B) Outcomes at Follow-up 
Grade in midterm exam 
(standardized) 
Standardized grades in 
midterm exams. (Scale in 
midterm exams: Min=0, 
Max=12). 
0.000 0.988 -1.876 1.436 42 
Average grade of take 
home-tests (standardized) 
Standardized grade of take 
home-take tests (Scale in take-
home tests: Min=o, Max=12). 
-0.000 0.989 -2.661 1.529 46 
Grade in final exam 
(standardized) 
Standardized grade in final 
exam (Scale in final exams: 
Min=0, Max=12). 
0.000 0.987 -1.825 2.004 40 
Total average grade 
accumulated in the 
student’s career 
Total average grade 
accumulated in the student’s 
career after the intervention. 
(Min=0, Max=12) 
7.623 1.954 0 10.5 48 
Average grade in 
homework & midterm 
exams in other 
simultaneous courses 
Average grade in homework & 
midterm exams in 
simultaneous courses (not the 
intervention ones). Min=0, 
Max=12. 
7.615 1.559 4 11.25 47 
Average grade in other 
simultaneous final exams 
Average grade in simultaneous 
final exams (not the 
intervention courses). Min=0, 
Max=12. 
7.995 1.477 5.25 10.75 47 
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Table 2 - Pre-treatment characteristics by treatment assignment 
. 
  
Treatment Control Difference 
Standard 
error 
P-value Observations 
Age (in months) 236.214 245.273 9.059 6.984 0.201 48 
Work 0.083 0.125 0.042 0.090 0.645 48 
Volunteer 0.167 0.208 0.042 0.115 0.719 48 
High school 1 0.125 0.208 0.083 0.109 0.449 48 
High School 2 0.167 0.125 -0.042 0.104 0.690 48 
Interior 0.375 0.292 -0.083 0.138 0.550 48 
Hours of sport per 
week 
5.221 5.500 0.279 1.150 0.809 48 
Satisfaction with 
classmates 
4.208 4.083 -0.125 0.262 0.635 48 
Average grade 7.879 7.233 -0.646 0.606 0.292 48 
Female 0.458 0.375 -0.083 0.145 0.568 48 
Bachelor in economics 0.625 0.542 -0.083 0.145 0.568 48 
Travel time to 
university (minutes) 
25.291 23.333 -1.958 5.392 0.718 48 
Group (1= 
Macroeconomics, 0 = 
Descriptive 
Economics) 
0.500 0.500 0.000 0.147 1.000 48 
Study in group (in % 
of the time) 
0.337 0.333 -0.004 0.058 0.945 48 
Friends (%) 0.142 0.108 -0.035 0.036 0.343 48 
Still unknown (%) 0.584 0.625 0.041 0.085 0.627 48 
Educational 
Aspirations 
3.708 3.500 -0.208 0.321 0.520 48 
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Table 3 - The effect of high frequency tasks on academic achievement by outcome 
 
Treatment Control Diff 
Standard 
error 
p value Observations 
Effects on educational 
outcomes 
      
Grade in midterm exam 
(standardized) 
.2195189 -.2414707 -.4609896 .3002362 .1325528 42 
       
Grade in final exam 
(standardized) 
.0968753 -.1184031 -.2152784 .3158964 .4996976 40 
       
Average grade of take 
home-tests 
(standardized) 
.0258865 -.0284756 -.0543621 .3088376 .861165 42 
 
 
Spillover effects 
      
       
Average grade in 
homework & midterm 
exams in other 
simultaneous courses 
7.958 7.4368 -.5212 .4940708 .2977971 42 
       
Average grade in other 
simultaneous final 
exams 
8.231591 7.96275 -.2688409 .462439 .5642635 42 
       
Total average grade 
accumulated in the 
student’s career 
8.109091 7.74 -.3690909 .5066478 .4705537 42 
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Table 4 - Pre-treatment balance by joint-liability treatment 
       
 
Joint-
Liability 
Control 
group 
Differenc
e 
Standard 
Error 
p-Value #Obs. 
Age (in months) 237.166 235.150 -2.017 4.082 0.623 87 
       
Work 0.077 0.182 0.105 0.075 0.166 87 
       
Volunteering 0.200 0.182 -0.018 0.099 0.855 87 
       
High School 1 0.185 0.091 -0.094 0.091 0.307 87 
       
High School 2 0.200 0.318 0.118 0.104 0.260 87 
       
Interior 0.262 0.227 -0.034 0.108 0.753 87 
       
Hours of sport per week 4.889 4.955 0.065 0.917 0.943 87 
       
Satisfaction with 
classmates 
4.169 4.318 0.149 0.196 0.450 87 
       
Average Grade 7.888 7.627 -0.260 0.405 0.522 87 
       
Bachelor in Economics 0.585 0.455 -0.130 0.123 0.294 87 
       
Macro Course 0.492 0.545 0.053 0.125 0.671 87 
       
Study group (in % time) 0.327 0.374 0.047 0.056 0.408 87 
       
Friends (%) 0.136 0.185 0.048 0.029 0.095 87 
       
Still unknown (%) 0.561 0.496 -0.065 0.065 0.318 87 
       
Educational aspirations 3.662 3.773 0.111 0.252 0.660 87 
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Table 5 – Baseline Characteristics by gender 
 
Female Male Difference 
Standard 
Error 
p-Value Observations 
Age (in months) 235.205 237.501 2.296 3.676 0.534 87.000 
Work 0.094 0.109 0.015 0.068 0.823 87.000 
Volunteering 0.250 0.164 -0.086 0.089 0.333 87.000 
High School 1 0.063 0.218 0.156 0.081 0.058 87.000 
High School 2 0.188 0.255 0.067 0.094 0.479 87.000 
Interior 0.226 0.255 0.029 0.098 0.769 86.000 
Hours of sport per week 3.353 5.809 2.456 0.782 0.002 87.000 
Satisfaction with classmates 4.313 4.145 -0.167 0.177 0.347 87.000 
Average Grade 8.416 7.476 -0.939 0.351 0.009 87.000 
Bachelor in Economics 0.719 0.455 -0.264 0.108 0.017 87.000 
Travel time to university 
(minutes) 
27.188 24.400 -2.788 3.716 0.455 87.000 
Course 0.313 0.618 0.306 0.107 0.006 87.000 
Study in group (in % of the 
time) 
0.345 0.336 -0.009 0.051 0.855 87.000 
Friends (%) 0.086 0.185 0.099 0.024 0.000 87.000 
Still unknown (%) 0.659 0.478 -0.181 0.056 0.002 87.000 
Educational aspirations 3.781 3.636 -0.145 0.226 0.524 87.000 
Year 0.625 0.400 -0.225 0.110 0.043 87.000 
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Joint-liability Control Counterfactual
Table 6 – Effects of Joint-Liability incentives on the difference in student’s grade 
average 
  
Difference in total average grade 
accumulated in the student’s career 
(1) (2) (3) 
        
Joint Liability Incentives 0.617*** 0.401* 0.395* 
[0.222] [0.230] [0.233] 
Female 0.038 
[0.120] 
Year (1=High frequency experiment, 0= 
Joint-liability vs. individual incentives 
experiment) 0.344*** 0.341*** 
[0.104] [0.105] 
Group (1= Macroeconomics, 0 = 
Descriptive Economics) 0.175 0.185 
[0.147] [0.153] 
Age (in months) -0.001 -0.001 
[0.003] [0.003] 
Region (Interior=1, Montevideo=0) -0.165 -0.162 
[0.229] [0.229] 
Constant -0.695*** -0.440 -0.472 
[0.214] [0.789] [0.768] 
Observations 87 86 86 
R-squared 0.152 0.220 0.221 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 1 
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Table 7 – Effects of Joint-Liability incentives on the difference 
in student’s grade average considering interaction terms 
 
Difference in total average grade 
accumulated in the student’s 
career 
 (1) (2) 
   
Joint Liability Incentives 0.751*** 0.537** 
 
[0.259] [0.261] 
Female 0.575 0.606* 
 
[0.391] [0.338] 
Female*Joint Liability Incentives -0.644 -0.683* 
 
[0.409] [0.361] 
Year (1=High frequency 
experiment, 0= Joint-liability vs. 
individual incentives 
experiment) 
 
0.355*** 
  
[0.103] 
Group (1= Macroeconomics, 0 = 
Descriptive Economics)  
0.195 
  
[0.148] 
Age (in months) 
 
-0.001 
  
[0.003] 
Region (Interior=1, 
Montevideo=0)  
-0.126 
  
[0.221] 
Constant -0.800*** -0.615 
 
[0.250] [0.795] 
   
Observations 87 86 
R-squared 0.180 0.251 
Robust standard errors  in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
    
 
 
